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Notes
RESOLUTION TRUST CORP. v. CITYFED FINANCIAL CORP.: THE
STATE LAW AND FEDERAL COMMON LAW DISTINCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
The passage of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and En-
forcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) represents a reaction to the savings and
loan crisis of the 1980s.1 During that decade, a record number of banks
failed.2 In response, Congress enacted FIRREA so that the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) could recoup a portion of its losses. 3
A recent report has indicated that the original $100 billion bailout cost by
the government could escalate to approximately $1 trillion.4 As a result,
and for the first time in its history, Congress enacted a standard of liability
applicable to directors and officers of financial depository institutions. 5
Congress had two main objectives for doing so. First, Congress intended
to defray the bailout costs by collecting from former directors and officers
of failed banks. 6 Second, Congress wanted to codify a standard of liability
1. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 101(5), (9), (10), 103 Stat. 183, 187 (1989) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994)).
2. See Paul T. Clark et al., Regulations of Savings Associations Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. LAw. 1013 (1990)
(noting total bank failure rate from 1980 to 1988 was three and one half times rate
since 1935); see also RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir. 1994) (Posner,
CJ., dissenting) (stating during nationwide banking crisis banks "were failing like
ninepins").
3. See FDIC v. Burrell, 779 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (finding pur-
pose of § 1821 is "to strengthen the civil sanctions... for defrauding or otherwise
damaging depository institutions and their depositors"). See generally Michael P.
Battin, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2347, 2347-48
(1995) (noting that "[iun the words of President Bush, § 1821(k) was enacted to
enable the FDIC to 'seek out and punish those that have committed wrongdoing
in the management of these failed institutions"').
4. Christopher T. Gorman, Liability of Directors and Officers Under FIRREA: The
Uncertain Standard of § 1821(k) and the Need for Congressional Reform, 83 Ky. LJ. 653,
653 (1995) (stating loss represents over 22 million depositors in failed financial
institutions).
5. See Battin, supra note 3, at 2348 ("To effectuate these purposes, Congress
for the first time legislated on the standard of liability applicable to directors of
federally insured banks.") (citing RTC v. Rahn, 854 F. Supp. 480, 485 (W.D. Mich.
1994)). The Rahn court noted that "[p]rior to enacting section 1821(k), 'Con-
gress had not legislated on the scope of claims brought by the FDIC against direc-
tors and officers of failed savings and loan associations."' Rahn, 854 F. Supp. at 485
(quoting FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1553 (S.D. Fla. 1993)).
6. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 653 (stating Congress feels bank executives
were "largely responsible for the crisis in the first place"); see also Battin, supra note
(1035)
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so that current executives would more carefully manage their banks. 7
Under 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (k) of FIRREA, the directors and officers of failed
financial institutions can be held individually liable for their mismanage-
ment if their conduct constitutes gross negligence. 8 The text of
§ 1821(k), however, is ambiguous and has resulted in a split among com-
mentators and courts regarding its interpretation. 9 The source of the dis-
pute involves whether § 1821(k) preempts state or federal common law
actions for conduct less egregious than gross negligence. 10
3, at 2347 (claiming many bank failures are caused by either intentional fraud or
some degree of negligent mismanagement). But seeJames T. Pitts et al., FDIC/RTC
Suits Against Bank and Thrift Officers and Directors-Why Now, What's Left?, 63 FoRii-
HAM L. REv. 2087, 2087 (1995) (claiming bank crisis was due mainly to congres-
sional deregulation of savings and loan industry and that blame was shifted
towards directors and officers only after crisis exploded).
7. Battin. supra note 3, at 2348.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). Section 1821(k) provides in pertinent part:
(k) Liability of directors and officers. A director or officer of an insured
depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary dam-
ages in any civil action by, on behalf of, or at the request or direction of
the Corporation, which action is prosecuted wholly or partially for the
benefit of the Corporation-
(1) acting as conservator or receiver of such institution,
(2) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed by such receiver or conservator,
or
(3) acting based upon a suit, claim, or cause of action purchased
from, assigned by, or otherwise conveyed in whole or in part by an in-
sured depository institution or its affiliate in connection with assistance
provided under section 13 [12 U.S.C.S. § 1823], for gross negligence, in-
cluding any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a greater disre-
gard of a duty of care (than gross negligence) including intentional
tortious conduct, as such terms are defined and determined under appli-
cable State law. Nothing in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right
of the Corporation under other applicable law.
Id. This section also allows liability to be imposed for intentional tortious con-
duct. Id. The first sentence of the section is a substantive sentence and establishes
a gross negligence cause of action. Id. The second sentence is a savings clause. Id.
9. Compare David B. Fischer, Bank Director Liability Under FIRREA: A New De-
fense For Directors and Officers of Insolvent Depository Institutions-Or a Tighter Noose?,
39 UCLA L. REV. 1703 (1992) (concluding sociological and psychological reasons
indicate that directors should not be held to standard of liability less culpable than
gross negligence), with Battin, supra note 3, at 2347 (concluding policy reasons
support allowance for simple negligence actions), and Gorman, supra note 4, at
653 (concluding economic reasons demand allowance for simple negligence ac-
tions). E.g., Fischer, supra note 9, at 1709, 1756-76 (noting regulators interpret
§ 1821(k) as setting threshold standard of liability at gross negligence but still per-
mitting simple negligence actions where state or federal common law permits).
Directors and officers interpret § 1821(k) as an exclusive standard of liability of
gross negligence. Id. For a discussion of federal courts' treatment on the preemp-
tion of § 1821 (k), see infra notes 66-95 and accompanying text
10. See Battin, supra note 3, at 2349 (discussing conflicts among courts due to
ambiguity of § 1821 (k)); Steven B. Price, FIRREA's Statute on the Standard of Liability
for Bank Directors and Officers: Through the Looking Glass of New Textualism, 30 IDAHO
L. REv. 219, 222-23 (1994) (same). Battin explains the distinction between simple
1036
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Recently, in Resolution Trust Corp. v. CityFed Financial Corp. ("RTC v.
CityFed Financial Corp.")," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit addressed this double-preemption issue in a case of first im-
pression. 12 The Third Circuit's conclusion differed from the holdings of
the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Cir-
cuits. 13 The Third Circuit justified its departure from these circuits by
concluding that Congress did not intend to displace any available federal
common law actions for simple negligence by enacting § 1821(k). 14 By
preserving the state law negligence action, however, the Third Circuit's
decision is consistent with those of the other circuits. 15
and gross negligence by defining each term. Battin, supra note 3, at 2351 n.26.
Simple negligence is the failure to use that degree of care that would be exercised
by an ordinarily prudent person. Id. (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1383 (6th ed.
1990)). Gross negligence is the intentional failure to perform a duty in reckless
disregard of the consequences. Id. Most importantly, gross negligence actions re-
quire a higher showing of wrongdoing than is necessary for simple negligence ac-
tions. Id.
11. 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995).
12. Id. at 1237 (noting issue is "whether Congress, by its enactment of
§ 1821 (k), also preempted state law or displaced federal common law actions that
impose liability for conduct less culpable than gross negligence"). The Third Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court on the state law preemption issue but reversed on
the federal common law preemption issue. Id. at 1249. The district court denied
the defendant's motion for dismissal and summary judgment in holding that
§ 1821(k) did not preempt any simple negligence actions under New Jersey law.
Id. The district court, however, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss regard-
ing the federal common law claim and held that § 1821(k) displaced any available
federal common law claims for simple negligence. Id. Also, the Third Circuit
noted that the district court ruled on the scope of the New Jersey business judg-
ment rule. Id. at 1236 n.6. The circuit court concluded, however, this issue was
"not ripe for decision." Id.
13. See, e.g., RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding federal
common law action for simple negligence "superseded" by § 1821(k)); FDIC v.
Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding § 1821(k) preempted any federal
common law action for simple negligence because two cannot coexist together);
RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding any federal common law
actions for simple negligence preempted by § 1821(k)); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d
416 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding § 1821(k) preempts any federal common law actions
for simple negligence).
14. CityFed, 57 F,3d at 1235, 1244-49. In accordance with at least two circuit
courts, this Note will refer to the preemption of the federal common law as "dis-
placement" and continue to use the term "preemption" in regards to state law
preemption. This is to avoid any confusion between the two different authorities
of law. See id. at 1235 n.1 (" [C] onfusion can result when the term 'preemption' is
used to refer to the displacement of federal common law by federal statutory en-
actments." (citing Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 n.9 (1981))); RTC v.
Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995) (Alsop,J., concurring) (agreeing distinc-
tion should be made between "preemption" of state laws and "supersession" of
federal common law, but this has not affected substantive reasoning by previous
courts that did not use different terms: "The difference ... is one of semantics and
not one of reasoning.").
15. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1235, 1243-44.
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Part I of this Note reviews the history of individual liability for direc-
tors and officers of financial institutions. 16 Additionally, it discusses the
trend toward increasing executive liability and the state legislative reac-
tions to this trend. 17 Finally, Part I discusses the rationale of FIRREA and
the conflicting interpretations of § 1821 (k).' 8 Part II traces the federal
courts' interpretations of § 1821 (k)'s preemptive effects on simple negli-
gence actions. 19 Part II describes the facts and procedural history of RTC
v. CityFed Financial Corp. and analyzes the rationale behind the court's de-
cision.20 Part IV discusses the impact of the CityFed decision on the direc-
tors and officers of financial institutions and corporate executives. 2 1 This
Note concludes that the ultimate resolution of the issue in CityFed requires
either congressional reform or United States Supreme Court review.22
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW ON THE INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS
AND OFFICERS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
A. Briggs v. Spaulding: The Seminal Case
In 1891, the United States Supreme Court first ruled on the duty of
care owed by directors of financial institutions in Briggs v. Spauld-
ing.23 The Court used broad vague language in establishing the stand-
ard of liability. 24 This has resulted in a variety of mixed interpreta-
16. For a discussion of the history of liability on the part of financial institu-
tions' directors and officers, see infra notes 23-65 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of how state legislatures responded to increasing director
and officer liability standards, see infra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the enactment of FIRREA and the conflicting preemp-
tion interpretations of § 1821(k) concerning simple negligence actions, whether
based on state or federal law, see infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of how the federal courts have interpreted § 1821(k) in
the context of preemption of simple negligence actions, see infra notes 66-95 and
accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the case background and an analysis of CityFed, see
infra notes 96-186 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the impact of the CityFed decision, see infra note 190
and accompanying text.
22. For this Note's conclusion, see infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
The CityFed court correctly construed § 1821(k) to permit state law negligence ac-
tions. The court, however, did not interpret § 1821(k) correctly in not displacing
federal common law actions.
23. 141 U.S. 132 (1891) (involving claim by bank receiver against bank's di-
rectors for mismanagement).
24. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1712-13 (discussing "imprecision" of Briggs
standard). In Briggs, the Court held that "the degree of care to which [bank direc-
tors are] bound is that which ordinary prudent and diligent men would exercise
under similar circumstances." Briggs, 141 U.S. at 152. Justifying the vagueness of
this standard, the Court reasoned that the degree of care to be applied depends on
the subject and the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 147. Thus, the Court be-
lieved it was "unnecessary to attempt to define with precision the degree of care
and prudence." Id.; see also Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Fiduciary Duties'Demanding
Cousin: Bank Director Liability for Unsafe or Unsound Banking Practices, 63 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 175, 181 (1995) (noting Briggs's broad standard derived from tort law).
1038 [Vol. 41: p. 1035
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tions.235 The decision advanced a fact-sensitive and result-oriented rule.2 6
Courts have interpreted Briggs as establishing an ordinary care standard
reasoning that the nature of managing a bank requires a greater amount
of care than managing a nonfinancial institution.2 7 Nevertheless, courts
have generally adopted the Briggs rule as the federal common law
standard.2 8
Many state legislatures, however, did not construe Briggs as establish-
ing either an ordinary care or a gross negligence standard.29 Neverthe-
less, most state "director-liability" statutes have incorporated the Briggs
language in whole or in part.3 0 Moreover, the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act used the Briggs language in its standard of liability for bank direc-
25. Schooner, supra note 24, at 181 (discussing different standards applied
under Briggs); see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 1713 (noting that Briggs's vague
standard has led to "uneven" law). The difficulty lies in the fact that the Court
ruled in favor of an ordinary care standard, however, it used language that pointed
to a more culpable standard of gross negligence. See Schooner, supra note 24, at
183 n.45 ("Briggs... could be used to support either a simple negligence standard
or a gross negligence standard."); see also Fischer, supra note 9, at 1715 ("Thus, in a
single paragraph, the Court seemed to establish both a stringent 'ordinary care'
standard and a more lenient 'gross inattention' standard.").
26. See generally Fischer, supra note 9, at 1713 (noting courts use Briggs to
either hold bank directors liable or absolve them). One commentator has noted
that "strict courts have often invoked the Briggs formula to hold defendant direc-
tors liable even for acts or omissions characterized as simple or ordinay negligence,
but more lenient courts have frequently cited similar Briggs language even when
absolving directors who had committed acts of gross negligence." Id.
27. See generally Schooner, supra note 24, at 182 ("[C]onduct that amounts to
ordinary care in affairs of some businesses may not amount to ordinary care in the
affairs of a bank."). Even before federal deposit insurance was created, there was a
recognized need to protect depositors from losing their life savings. Id. Some
courts, however, held bank directors to a stricter standard of care even after the
FDIC was formed. Id.
28. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1716 ("The Briggs Court's stated formula has
been faithfully invoked-though not necessarily applied-as federal common law
for a century."). One commentator has stated that many courts have subtly bent
the standard announced in Briggs to ensure their views were expressed in their stan-
dards that they established. See id. at 1716 n.50.
29. See id. at 1713 (noting Briggs continues to dominate common and statu-
tory law). States that have desired to codify a standard of liability for directors of
financial institutions used Briggs as a starting point. Id.
30. Id. Typically, the state statute incorporates the "ordinary prudent" and
"under similar circumstances" phrases and contains any additional qualifications
the state legislatures deemed appropriate. Id. at 1716 n.51. Currently, 12 states
have statutes that adopt the Briggs language. See ALA. CODE § 10-2A-74 (1994);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(d) (1991); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-300 (Michie
1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30 (1996); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2035 (1993); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:35 (Supp. 1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(a) (1996);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50(1) (1995); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(B)
(Banks-Baldwin 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-301(a) (1995); WASH. REv. CODE
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tors.3 1 Because of the ambiguity in Briggs, however, a conflict developed
within the courts regarding the level of negligent culpability required by
the statutes for liability. 32 This conflict set the stage for Smith v. Van
Gorkom,33 the landmark director-liability case in Delaware.
B. The Business Judgment Rule and Director Liability Crisis
During the corporate heyday of the 1980s, substantial mergers and
acquisitions, leveraged buyouts and sales of corporate assets produced sig-
nificant amounts of litigation. When these deals adversely impacted the
stockholders, corporate directors and officers were often targeted for lia-
bility.3 4 This rise in personal liability lawsuits against corporate directors
and officers resulted in a director and officer liability insurance crisis in
the mid-1980s.3 5 In turn, a lack of insurance led to a personal liability
crisis for directors and officers.3 6
Historically, the business judgment rule has provided corporate direc-
tors and officers with substantial leeway in making business decisions. 37
When the requirements of the business judgment rule are satisfied, courts
give substantial deference to directors and officers. 38 The purpose of the
31. See REv. MODEL Bus. CoRn'. ACT § 8.30(a)(2) (1990). Section 8.30(a) (2)
provides: "A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as
a member of a committee: ... (2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a
like position would exercise under similar circumstances .... Id.
32. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1716 n.50 (noting that Brggs is ambiguous
because it is capable of having either simple or gross negligence standard, as evi-
denced by courts' treatment of Briggs rule).
33. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
34. See Roberta Romano, What Went Wrong with Directors' and Officers' Liability
Insurance?, 14 DEL.J. CORP. L. 1, 13-15 (1989) (discussing causes of directors' and
officers' liability insurance crisis during mid-1980s). Specifically, Romano cites
three major litigation-spawning business phenomena during that decade: (1)
Mergers and acquisitions because shareholders objected either to the terms of the
deal, the disclosure about the deal, or the defensive methods used to try to prevent
a deal; (2) Initial public offerings of stock because the stock prices fell
unexpectanly; (3) Bankruptcies in record numbers because trustees, shareholders
and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation were attempting to collect on the
directors' and officers' liability insurance policy money. Id.
35. Id. During the early 1980s, the director and officer liability insurance
market endured a crisis whereby many companies were unable to obtain personal
liability insurance for their directors and officers and sent a wave of fear through-
out the executive community. Id. at 9. One commentator has postulated three
general causes of the insurance crisis. Id. at 13-25. First, increased litigation
against executives due to the three business conditions. Id. Second, increased re-
insurance rates. Id. Third, changes in the substantive law of director and officer
liability. Id.
36. See Price, supra note 10, at 229 (noting for first time in business history,
directors and officers feared their personal assets were substantially at risk).
37. See Charles D. Lewis, The Business Judgment Rule and Corporate Director's Lia-
bility for Mismanagement, 22 BAYLOR L. REv. 157 (1970) (providing historical back-
ground of business judgment rule).
38. EDwARD F. BRODSKY, LAw OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS § 2.06
(1992). The five preconditions to application of the business judgment rule are:
1040 [Vol. 41: p. 1035
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business judgment rule is to preventjudicial examination of certain execu-
tive decisions.39 In Delaware, the business judgment rule represents a pre-
sumption that directors have "acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the best interests of the company."40
State legislatures in thirty-four states have codified the duty of care
required of directors and officers. 4 1 These statutes, however, are not uni-
form in their standards of care. 42 In addition, state courts have applied
standards of liability ranging from simple negligence to conduct more cul-
pable than gross negligence. 43 Thus, neither the state legislatures nor
the state courts have agreed on one uniform formulation of the business
judgment rule."4 It should be noted, however, that the business judg-
ment rule prevents liability in most cases, regardless of the standard
the court employs. 4 5 This uncertainty regarding the appropriate stan-
(1) No self-dealing by the director or officer making the decision; (2) Judgment (a
decision or a conscious decision not to decide) must have actually been made; (3)
Judgment must been made in good faith; (4) No gross abuse of discretion; (5)
Must act with degree of care required under state law (statute or common law). Id.
The business judgment rule stems from the proposition that an effective cor-
porate executive must occasionally participate in risky transactions due to competi-
tion and the nature of capitalism. Fischer, supra note 9, at 1717-18. Executives
would be wary and become risk-adverse, however, if courts were allowed to use
hindsight and scrutinize every business decision that resulted in a loss to constitu-
ents. Id. See generally E. Norman Veasey, New Insights into Judicial Deference to Direc-
tors' Business Decisions: Should We Trust the Courts?, 39 Bus. LAw. 1461 (1984)
(arguing business judgment rule gives undue deference to directors' decisions).
39. See BRODSKY, supra note 38, § 2.06.
40. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In Aronson, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court noted that the courts will not substitute their judgment for
that of directors if there is no showing of abuse of discretion. Id. The plaintiff has
the burden to rebut the presumption of the business judgment ruled. Id.
41. BRODSKY, supra note 38, at 13 n.1.
42. Id. (noting generally four standards used: (1) prudent person in like posi-
tion; (2) notice-inquiry; (3) personal business affairs; and (4) miscellaneous: i.e.,
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.8-300 (Michie 1989)).
43. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1713 (discussing range of Briggs standards); see
also DENNIS BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESSJUDGMENT RuLE: FIDUCIARY DuTIES OF COR-
PoRATE DIREcroRs 63 (4th ed. 1993) (noting courts' different interpretations of
requisite level of negligence has resulted in business judgment rule standards rang-
ing from simple negligence to intentional misconduct).
44. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1713 (discussing variety of Briggs standards).
Compare Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (describing Delaware business judgment rule),
with Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.S. 2d 619, 630-31 (N.Y. 1979) (describing New
York business judgment rule).
45. See Stuart R. Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REv. 591, 594
(1983) (noting courts traditionally, and still do, use business judgment rule as ex-
cuse not to look in merits of plaintiff's complaint absent evidence of fraud or self-
dealing). This is why there are only seven cases where directors have been liable
for negligence where no self-dealing was present. Id. at 591 n.1.
See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1720-21 ("Thus, similar fact patterns may result in
liability or absolution, depending not only on the objective circumstances and facts
but also on the judge or judicial panel and on other subjective or inscrutable fac-
tors." (citations omitted)); see also BLOCK ET AL., supra note 43, at 63 ("[C]ourts
1996] NOTE 1041
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dard allowed the court in Van Gorkom to establish some straightforward
rules.4 6
C. Smith v. Van Gorkom: Increasing Director Liability
In 1980, Jerome Van Gorkom, the Chairman and Chief Executive Of-
ficer of the Trans Union Corporation ("Trans Union"), made an offer of a
cash-out merger without consulting the company's board of directors. 47
One day later, Van Gorkom called a special board of directors and senior
management meeting without disclosing the purpose of the meeting.4 8 At
the meeting Van Gorkom disclosed the basics of the cash-out merger
agreement.49 Finally, after only two hours of contemplation, the board
accepted the offer.50
Subsequently, the Trans Union shareholders brought a suit in equity
seeking rescission of the cash-out merger.5 1 The Delaware Supreme Court
held that the Board's approval of the merger agreement did not reflect
"the product of informed business judgment" and that "the Board did not
deal with complete candor with the stockholders. '52 The court concluded
that although the directors acted in good faith, their conduct constituted
gross negligence. 53
have rarely held directors liable 'simply for bad judgment."' (citing Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1993))).
46. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73, 893 (Del. 1985). The Briggs
decision and the business judgment rule created uncertainty over whether direc-
tors should be held to a simple or gross negligence standard.
47. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 866-67. The stock price of the offer was $55 per
share, however, over the previous five years the price had only fluctuated between
$24.25 and $39.50. Id. at 866 n.5.
48. Id. at 867. Van Gorkom failed to disclose the purpose of the meeting. Id.
The merger agreement was disclosed but the directors had only Van Gorkom's 20
minute oral presentation and a few other statements to use as information in
weighing the soundness of the agreement. Id. at 868. Moreover, Van Gorkom did
not tell the board how he arrived at $55 but insisted that the market would deter-
mine the fairness of the price. Id. Additionally, the Trans Union lawyer cautioned
the board that they could be sued if they did not accept the offer. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 869 (noting Van Gorkom executed merger agreement at social
event hosted for Chicago Lyric Opera and neither he no anyone else on board
read agreement prior to signing).
51. Id. at 863. The Trans Union shareholders' complaint averred that the
defendant directors breached their fiduciary duties to their shareholders because
they approved the cash-out merger without "due care and prudence." Id. at 871.
Further, the plaintiffs contended that the Court of Chancery erred in finding that
the directors' decision was sufficiently informed. Id. The Supreme Court agreed
with the plaintiffs and held that the Court of Chancery's decision was illogical be-
cause the directors were ultimately found grossly negligent in their decision to
approve the merger. Id. at 871-78.
52. Id. at 864.
53. Id. at 873-74. The court concluded that the directors were grossly negli-
gent because they did not adequately inform themselves as to Van Gorkom's activi-
ties and were uninformed as to the value of the company. Id. at 874.
1042 [Vol. 41: p. 1035
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Van Gorkom signified the trend during the 1980s of increased judicial
scrutiny of director decisions.5 4 This trend resulted in state concerns that
corporations would not be able to attract competent individuals to serve as
directors. 55 In response to this concern, most states enacted legislation
that limited director liability only to "reckless, willful, and wanton boar-
droom misconduct."56 Because these states rejected Van Gorkom, their
statutes impliedly stated that neither simple nor gross negligence should
govern directors.57 Based on the same policy concerns, other states re-
vised their corporate laws. These revisions permitted corporations to
adopt a provision within its articles of incorporation eliminating or limit-
ing director liability for simple and gross negligence. 58
54. Price, supra note 10, at 320. In Van Gorkom, the court ruled that the busi-
ness judgment rule's presumption of due care was overcome by gross negligence.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. Since Van Gorkom, some courts have increased their
scrutiny of director decisions and have held that an increasing number of misman-
agement acts fall within the scope of simple, rather than gross, negligence. See
Price, supra note 10, at 230 (stating "the [Van Gorkom] decision has been recog-
nized as expanding the ambit of conduct constituting gross negligence to mirror
conduct that is simple negligence") (citation omitted); see also Romano, supra note
34, at 23-25 (noting after Van Gorkom, courts uncertain which direction to decide
director-liability standard of care cases). For a detailed discussion of Van Gorkom,
see Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus.
LAw. 1437 (1985); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Trans Union Reconsid-
ered, 98 YALE LJ. 127 (1988); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life
in the Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAw. 1, 8-14 (1985); William T. Quillen,
Trans Union, Business Judgment, and Neutral Principles, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 465
(1985); Barry F. Schwartz & James G. Wiles, Trans Union: Neither "New" Law nor
"Bad"Law, 10 DEL. J. CoRn'. L. 429 (1985).
55. Resolution Trust Corp. v. CityFed Financial Corp. ("RTC v. CityFed Finan-
cial Corp."), 57 F.3d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1995). See generally Business Roundtable on
the American Law Institute's Proposed Principles of Corporate Governance and Structure:
Restatement and Recommendations 50 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter Business Roundtable]
(explaining main policy reason for business judgment rule is to encourage highly
qualified persons to become directors). 'The Business Roundtable generally op-
posed the ALI's version of the business judgment rule as codified in § 4.01 of its
Principles of Corporate Governance because it limited the deference given to di-
rectors. Id. at 6-7, 39-51. The Business Roundtable stated: "[Section 4.01] may
well result in... increased costs to the corporation.. . unwillingness and inability
to take the risks necessary to maintain competitiveness . . . an unwillingness of
qualified individuals to serve as corporate directors. Improved corporate effi-
ciency and accountability are not the likely result." Id. at 6.
56. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1239. This form of legislation has been called state
insulating statutes. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 667 n.102 (describing nationwide
movement to limit liability of officers and directors); Price, supra note 10, at 230
(stating that more than "four-fifths of the states enacted some form of legislation
designed to insulate directors and officers from personal liability" in negligence
suits). For examples of state insulating statutes, see Jon Shepherd, The Liability of
Officers and Directors Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovey, and Enforcement
Act of 1989, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1119, 1120 n.7 (1992) (citing 37 statutes).
57. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1239 (stating that "'race to the bottom' among cer-
tain states was a reaction to the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van
Gorhom").
58. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 666-67 (noting by 1988, 42 states enacted
form of this insulating legislation); Shepherd, supra note 56, at 1120 n.7 (listing
1996] NOTE 1043
9
Lam: Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp.: The State Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 1035
D. The Federal Response: FIRREA
In the wake of the savings and loan crisis, federal regulators at-
tempted to recover some of the billions of dollars lost from insuring the
failed financial institutions. 59 Recently enacted legislation, however, re-
quired the regulators to prove a high level of culpability in order to re-
cover. 60 In response, Congress enacted FIRREA § 1821 (k) to enhance the
regulators' ability to recover. 61
Section 1821(k) permits federal regulators to bring actions against
failed bank directors for gross negligence.6 2 Thus, § 1821(k) was in-
tended by Congress to preempt state insulating legislation. 63 The focus of
§ 1821(k) is its first two sentences because they establish a standard of
liability and contain a savings clause. 64 The savings clause is the portion of
states that have enacted insulating statutes). Delaware was one of first to imple-
ment this type of legislation in § 102(b) (7) which provides:
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's
duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omis-
sions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a
knowing violation of the law; ... or (iv) for any transaction from which
the director derived an improper personal benefit.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (7) (1991).
59. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1239 (noting that "regulators of federally insured
depository institutions were embarking on a concerted litigation campaign to
recoup from allegedly corrupt and incompetent directors a portion of the billions
of federal dollars lost in the bankruptcy of federally insured thrifts").
60. Id.; see also Pitts et al., supra note 6, at 2088 (recognizing regulators usually
assert negligence claims against former directors of failed banks, not more culpa-
ble intentional misconduct claims).
61. Ronald R. Glancz, Government Is Dealt Series of Setbacks in D&O Liability
Cases, 14 BANKING POL'Y REP. 5 (June 19, 1995); Gorman, supra note 4, at 667-71
(stating that Congress intended to establish a uniform liability standard which
would "preempt the application of any other law, including a state law that would
impose a more stringent liability standard"). Section 1821(k) was enacted so that
directors and officers could be sued for conduct less egregious than the inten-
tional misconduct standard. Id.
62. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). The statute provides: "A director or officer of
an insured depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary dam-
ages in any civil action by, or on behalf of... the [RTC] ... acting as conservator
or receiver of such institution ... for gross negligence." Id.
63. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1237 ("All parties agree that in enacting § 1821(k)
Congress intended to preempt state laws that limit the liability of directors and
officers .... "); see also 135 CONG. REc. S4278-79 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1989) (state-
ment of Sen. Riegle) (stating that "[s] tate law would be overruled ... to the extent
that it forbids the FDIC to bring suit based on 'gross negligence' or an 'intentional
tort'").
64. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994) (defining liability of directors and of-
ficers). The first sentence of § 1821(k) establishes the standard of liability for di-
rectors of financial institutions. It provides: "A director or officer of an insured
depository institution may be held personally liable for monetary damages.., for
gross negligence, including any similar conduct or conduct that demonstrates a
greater disregard of duty of care (than gross negligence)." Id. The second sen-
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§ 1821(k) that has caused a split among the federal courts regarding
whether the savings clause preempts state or federal common law actions
based on simple negligence. 65
III. CONTROVERSY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OVER PREEMPTIVE
SCOPE OF § 1821(k)
A. Preemption of State Law
Most courts have held that § 1821(k) only partially preempts state
law. 66 For example, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and
Tenth Circuits have held that state law actions premised upon simple neg-
ligence are not preempted by § 1821 (k) because they fell under "other
applicable law." 67 Both Circuits used similar analysis to support their con-
clusions. 68 They relied upon the language of the statute to demonstrate
tence contains a savings clause which provides: "Nothing in this paragraph shall
impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other applicable law." Id.
65. See Glancz, supra note 61, at 5 ("The savings clause . . . has prompted
extensive debate and numerous court decisions over whether Congress intended
to preempt state law and federal common law by establishing a national standard
of care .... "). Some federal courts hold that § 1821(k) does not preempt state
insulating statutes that allow simple negligence liability. See, e.g., FDIC v. Mc-
Sweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 446 (10th Cir.
1992); Washington Bancocorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256 (D.D.C. 1993).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).
67. See, e.g., McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537; Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446. In Canfield,
the FDIC sued former bank directors for negligent mismanagement and the dis-
trict court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. Id. at 443. The Tenth Cir-
cuit reversed and held that § 1821(k) did not preempt state law simple negligence
actions. Id. The court placed emphasis on the plain language of § 1821(k). Id. at
446. The court interpreted the savings clause as preserving all other applicable
law, including state law actions for simple negligence. Id.
In McSweeney, the FDIC sued two former bank directors for breach of fiduciary
duties and the district court denied defendants' motion to dismiss. McSweeney, 976
F.2d at 532. The Ninth Circuit held that § 1821 (k) did not preempt state law sim-
ple negligence actions. Id. at 539. The court began its analysis with a review of the
purposes underlying FIRREA: to strengthen both the regulators' enforcement
powers and the civil sanctions for damaging depository institutions and their de-
positors. Id. at 537. The court concluded that there was nothing in the savings
clause that would prohibit state law actions for simple negligence. Id. at 538. It
analogized to a previous case where it held a savings clause allowed a common law
fiduciary duty action. See id. ("'To hold otherwise would render the (savings
clause] language ... mere surplusage."' (quoting Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 158
(9th Cir. 1964))).
68. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 537 (construing statutory language according to its
plain meaning); Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446 ("In our judgment, the words used in
section 1821(k) to describe the potential liability of officers and directors belie the
creation of an exclusive federal liability standard."). Both courts analyzed the term
"may" as it is used in § 1821(k) and stated that it did not mean "may only." Mc-
Sweeney, 976 F.2d at 537 ("Had Congress intended ... to limit the FDIC to claims
alleging gross negligence or greater culpability, it would have inserted the word
'only' in the sentence."); Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446. They interpreted "may" as
merely being a permissive term and therefore not requiring the courts to infer a
limitation on the standards of liability. Id. at 446 ("'May' is a permissive term, and
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that Congress did not intend § 1821(k) to create a national standard of
liability.69 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits noted that full state law preemp-
tion would provide an incentive for a director of a failing bank to allow it
to go insolvent, thereby taking advantage of the exclusive gross negligence
standard.7 0 Additionally, at the district court level, many courts have held
that § 1821(k) does not preempt state law actions for conduct less culpa-
ble than gross negligence.
7 1
The minority view regarding state law preemption is that § 1821(k)
establishes an exclusive national gross negligence standard of liability for
bank directors.72 As a result, all other actions based upon less culpable
it does not imply a limitation on the standard of officer and director liability.").
The courts also noted the pattern of usage of the savings clause phrase supported
their conclusion that simple negligence actions were not preempted. McSweeney,
976 F.2d at 538 (stating that rights to proceed against "officers for negligent
breach of the duty of care, whether under state or federal common law, are pre-
served by the plain language of the last sentence of § 1821 (k)"); Canfield, 967 F.2d
at 447 (noting Congress refers to "[the] whole universe of other laws" when it uses
language of type found in § 1821 (k) savings clause). Thus, reading the statute as a
whole, FIRREA's pattern of usage supports the partial preemption theory. Id. at
446-47.
69. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 539 (finding it "evident from the ... language of
§ 1821(k) that Congress did not intend to preclude the FDIC from bringing ac-
tions premised on [negligence]"); Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447 ("Nowhere does the
statute announce its intention to create a national standard of liability .... ").
Both courts offer § 1821 (k)'s language "for gross negligence . . . as such term[sic]
[is] defined and determined under applicable State law" as evidence that Congress
did not intend to create a uniform national standard when that standard would be
defined differently in each state. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 539 (stating that
§ 1821(k) incorporates "state definitions of gross negligence and intentional tor-
tious conduct, which vary from state to state").
70. McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540; Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449. Absurd results
would occur because a bank director is subject to simple negligence actions under
available state law before insolvency (i.e., before § 1821 (k) applies) but would then
be only subject to actions based on gross negligence or worse after insolvency. Id.;
see Battin, supra note 3, at 2360 ("Under the ... full preemption interpretation,
§ 1821(k) creates an incentive for negligent bank directors to allow their banks to
fail."); Fischer, supra note 9, at 1760 (giving examples of absurd results that would
ensue from interpretation of § 1821(k) as fully preemptive of state law).
71. See, e.g., RTC v. Fortunato, 1994 WL 478616, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 1994)
(concluding § 1821(k) does not preempt simple negligence claims); RTC v.
Domenico, 837 F. Supp. 623, 627 (D.NJ. 1993) (same); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp.
1359, 1363-64 (D. Utah 1993) (same); FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1514, 1545 (S.D.
Fla. 1993) (same); Washington Bancocorporation v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1265
(D.D.C. 1993) (same); FDIC v. Howse, 802 F. Supp. 1554, 1568 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(same); RTC v. Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595, 601 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same), affd 10
F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 1993); FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. 904, 907 (C.D. Ill. 1992)
(same); FSLIC v. Shelton, 789 F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (M.D. La. 1992) (same); FDIC v.
Williams, 779 F. Supp. 998, 1003 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (same); FDIC v. Fay, 779 F.
Supp. 66, 67 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (same); FDIC v. Haddad, 778 F. Supp. 1559, 1567
(S.D. Fla. 1991) (same); FDIC v. Isham, 777 F. Supp. 919, 922 (W.D. Okla. 1991)
(same).
72. See, e.g., RTC v. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. 1121, 1129-30 (D. Conn. 1994) (hold-
ing § 1821(k) established national standard of liability and therefore preempted
state law actions for negligence).
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conduct are preempted. 73 Only the Sixth Circuit, in dicta, used the legis-
lative history of FIRREA to illustrate that the statute established a national
standard of gross negligence which preempted all state law claims brought
against bank directors and officers. 74 Specifically, the court focused on
the House Conference Report's statement that, "[FIRREA] preempts State
law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in any capacity against
officers or directors." 75
Five federal district courts have followed the Sixth Circuit and held
that § 1821(k) preempted state law simple negligence actions. 76 One
court found express preemption in the statutory language itself in the sav-
ings clause. 77 The court also found that the overall legislative scheme es-
tablished implied preemption because it demonstrated congressional
intent to "superintend the field."'78
In sum, the courts explained that the ambiguous statutory language
of § 1821 (k) renders it "susceptible to two valid, yet diametrically opposed
interpretations." 79 The greatest degree of controversy in the federal court
73. Id.
74. Gaff v. FDK, 919 F.2d 384, 390-91 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The legislative history
of this provision explicitly states an intent to nationalize the law of directors' and
officers' liability when banks are taken over by the FDIC."). The Gaff court quoted
the legislative history: "'[§ 1821(k)] preempts State law .... The preemption al-
lows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross negligence or any conduct that demon-
strates a greater disregard of a duty of care."' Id. at 391 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 101-222, at 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 437)). The Gaff court
concluded this showed Congress's intent to nationalize the standard of directors'
and officers' liability. Id.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Camhi, 861 F. Supp. at 1129-30 (holding § 1821(k) expressly and
implicitly preempted all state law actions); see also, RTC v. O'Bear, Overhosler,
Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (concluding § 1821(k)
preempts state law simple negligence claims); FDIC v. Swager, 773 F. Supp. 1244,
1248 (D. Minn. 1991) (same); FDIC v. Canfield, 763 F. Supp. 533, 539 (D. Utah
1991) (same); FDIC v. Brown, No. CIV.NC89-30G, 1991 WL 294524, at *1 (D. Utah
Nov. 18, 1991) (same).
77. Camhi, 861 F. Supp. at 1129. In Camhi, the court reasoned that some law
must be impaired for a savings clause to be necessary and concluded that this
means state law. Id. If Congress intended to save state law actions it would have
drafted the savings clause to read "any applicable law." Id. Moreover, in order to
remain consistent with other sections of FIRREA, the savings clause would have to
read "applicable State law" if state law actions were intended to be preserved be-
cause Congress used those exact words when referring to state law. Id. at 1130.
Finally, Congress did not extend the savings clause to "eviscerate" the gross negli-
gence set forth in the preceding sentence of § 1821(k). Id. (citing O'Bear, 840 F.
Supp. at 1277).
78. Id. at 1130. In Camhi, the court used the dicta of Gaff to find congres-
sional intent to nationalize the standard of liability of bank directors. Id. Also, the
relationship between the federal regulators and federally-insured financial institu-
tions requires a uniform national standard, thus allowing the regulators to bring
state law claims would interfere with the nature of this relationship. Id.
79. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 653-54 (stating that "the language of§ 1821(k) is ambiguous regarding the proper standard of care by which to evaluate
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system concerns whether § 1821 (k) preempts federal common law actions
for simple negligence.80
B. Displacement of Federal Common Law
The § 1821 (k) federal common law preemption issue has several re-
lated subissues that have likewise divided the federal courts.8 1 First, de-
bate exists over whether any federal common law governs bank director
liability.8 2 Second, certain courts used simple negligence as the federal
common law standard of bank director liability, while other courts used
gross negligence.8 3
The United States Supreme Court established the "speak directly"
test, which states that federal connom law is displaced if Congress in-
tended to merely "speak direcly" to the issue which was previously gov-
erned by the federal common law, in Milwaukee v. Illinois.8 4 This standard
is less stringent than that required to preempt state law. 85 Consequently,
the federal common law may be displaced while state law may be saved
from preemption.8 6
Federal circuit courts faced with the issue have unanimously pre-
empted simple negligence actions brought under federal common law.8 7
the conduct of... officers and directors"); Price, supra note 10, at 224 (stating that
language used by Congress in § 1821(k) is subject to two interpretations).
80. See Battin, supra note 3, at 2349 (finding § 1821 (k)'s ambiguity has caused
conflicting court decisions on various issues; Fischer, supra note 9, at 1709
(describing debate over differing interpretations of § 1821(k)).
81. For a further discussion of the subissues surrounding the § 1821(k) fed-
eral common law preemption issue, see infra notes 82-95 and accompanying text.
82. Compare First Hawaiian Bank v. Alexander, 558 F. Supp. 1128, 1131 (D.
Haw. 1983) (declining to recognize federal common law claims based on negli-
gence), and Fischer, supra note 9, at 1716 n.52 (asserting state law determines lia-
bility of bank directors within their jurisdictions), with FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp.
1541, 1544 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding federal common law contains applicable neg-
ligence standard), and Washington Bancorp. v. Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1266
(D.D.C. 1993) (same).
83. Compare RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1359 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding§ 1821(k) preempts federal common law standard of simple negligence); Mintz,
816 F. Supp. at 1544 (same), with Washington Bancorp., 812 F. Supp. at 1266 (noting
federal common law is gross negligence standard). But see FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gor-
rondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1550 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding no federal common
law cause of action exists for negligence).
84. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). The Supreme Court in Milwaukee held that the
Federal Water Polution Act Amendments of 1972 displaced federal common law
because Congress viewed the Amendments as "'total restructuring' and 'complete
rewriting' of the existing water polution legislation." Id. at 317.
85. Id. at 315-17 (noting distinction based on preserving states' police
powers).
86. Id. at 317.
87. RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295 (10th Cir. 1995); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369
(6th Cir. 1994); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1357; RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416 (7th Cir.
1993). The Miramon court noted that federal common law is "merely a necessary
expedient 'resorted to in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress.'" Miramon,
22 F.3d at 1360 (quoting Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 314 (1981)). Furthermore, federal
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These courts have concluded that Congress "spoke directly" to the issue of
bank director liability through the plain language of § 1821 (k). 88 The leg-
islative history of § 1821 (k) also served as a basis for the finding of federal
preemption. 89 The Senate adopted and the House approved an amend-
ment to the original version of § 1821 (k) establishing gross negligence as
the standard.90 Because the legislative history did not reveal Congress's
courts lack the power to create their own rules of decision because this power is
reserved to Congress alone. Id.
88. See, e.g., Bates, 42 F.3d at 371. The U.S. Supreme Court laid down the test
for determining when federal legislation preempts federal common law in Milwau-
kee, 451 U.S. at 304. There is a presumption that Congress has the responsibility of
establishing the appropriate standards, rather than the federal courts. Id. at 317.
Thus, when Congress "speaks directly" to an issue previously addressed by federal
common law, the federal statute governs through preemption. Id. at 313-15.
See Frates, 52 F.3d at 292-97; Bates, 42 F.3d at 371; Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1360-61;
Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 419-20. The courts discounted the importance of the term
"may" because it did not substantively qualify the statutory language. See Bates, 42
F.3d at 371 (noting "[t]he FDIC places undue emphasis on the word 'may"');
Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361 n.5 (noting "'[m]ay' cannot be reasonably read to qualify
the gross negligence standard and is therefore irrelevant to the substance of the
provision" (quoting Canfield, 967 F.2d at 450 n.4 (Borby, J., dissenting))); Gal-
lagher, 10 F.3d at 420 (same). Moreover, the savings clause intended to preserve
other powers of federal regulators but not federal common law actions for simple
negligence. See Bates, 42 F.3d at 372 (noting FIRREA grants federal regulators
power to remove negligent directors and issue cease and desist orders based on
simple negligence (citing Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421)); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361-62
(stating Congress did not intend savings clause to render § 1821 (k)'s gross negli-
gence standard nullity); Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421 (noting savings clause only
needed to ensure FIRREA was not interpreted to take away regulators' other non-
monetary powers).
89. See Bates, 42 F.3d at 372-73 (noting "[t]he legislative intent underlying di-
rector liability is insufficient to overcome the plain meaning of the statute").
90. 135 CONG. REc. S4454 (daily ed. April 19, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Riegle) (stating that financial institutions may be penalized only if "violation,
breach, or practice ... resulted from gross negligence"). The original version of
§ 1821(k) provided a cause of action for anything available at common law, "in-
cluding, but not limited to, negligence." Id. The amendment raised the minimum
level from negligence to gross negligence. Id. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183,
reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86.
The federal appellate courts noted that the need to attract and retain compe-
tent directors on corporate boards motivated this amendment. See Bates, 42 F.3d at
373 (noting less stringent gross negligence standard was needed to attract highly
qualified directors); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1362; Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 422; see also 135
CONG. REc. S4264 (daily ed. April 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (cautioning
that "without a clarifying amendment, financial institutions may lose effective di-
rectors, maybe an entire board of directors"). As support for their decisions, the
courts cited two failed post-enactment efforts at amending § 1821(k) to expressly
allow simple negligence actions. Bates, 42 F.3d at 372 (noting "[n]o amendment
would be necessary if the savings clause preserved federal common law claims for
simple negligence"); Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1363 (noting "[t]hese two attempts...
belie the [federal regulators'] position .... ); Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 423 ("These
post-enactment efforts to amend § 1821(k) to reinstate a simple negligence stan-
dard of liability belie the RTC's contention that § 1821(k) as enacted, preserved a
federal common law action for simple negligence."); see also Arthur W. Liebold,
Federal Common Law: What & Where?, in CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS,
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intent regarding the appropriate standard of liability, their plain language
interpretations would prevail.9 1
The minority view states that § 1821(k) does not preempt federal
common law actions premised on conduct less culpable than gross negli-
gence. 92 These courts concluded that the ambiguous statutory language
DiREcToRs, AND PROFESSIoNALs: BANK & THRIFT LITIGATION IN THE 1990'S, 153, 161
n.12 (1991) (outlining FDIC's proposed amendment); cf. H.R. 3435, 102d Cong.,
§ 228 (Comm. Markup Oct. 18, 1991) (outlining Congressman Richard Baker's
proposed amendment). The FDIC's proposed 1991 amendment provided: "Noth-
ing in this subsection shall impair or affect any right of the [FDIC] under other
applicable State or Federal law, including a right to hold such director or officer
personally liable for negligence." Liebold, supra, at 161 n.12. Similarly, Congress-
man Baker proposed an amendment in 1991 that provided that the RTC could
bring an action "under any provision of applicable State law or other Federal law,
including any provision of common law." H.R. 3435.
91. See Bates, 42 F.3d at 372 ("We are bound by the statutory language which
abrogates the federal common law cause of action for simple negligence .... ");
Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1363-64 (stating that "'plain meaning' of the statute provides
for gross negligence as the federal standard of liability"); Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 423
(stating that legislative history does not "demonstrate the kind of 'clearly ex-
pressed legislative intention' necessary to trump the plain meaning of the stat-
ute"). A majority of the federal district courts also held that § 1821(k) displaced
federal common law actions for simple negligence. See, e.g., RTC v. Zimmerman,
853 F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (concluding § 1821(k) displaces federal com-
mon law).
92. See RTC v. CityFed Financial Corp., 57 F.3d 1231 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding
§ 1821(k) does not displace federal common law). With the exception of the Ci-
tyFed decision, this view only exists at the district court level. See, e.g., RTC v. Smith,
872 F. Supp. 805 (D. Or. 1995) (concluding § 1821(k) does not displace federal
common law simple negligence claims); RTC v. Gibson, 829 F. Supp. 1110, 1118
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (same); RTC v. Hess, 820 F. Supp. 1359, 1364 (D. Utah 1993)
(same); RTC v. Kidd, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18439 (D. Wyo. 1993) (same); RTC v.
Thomas, 1993 WL 501116 (D. Kan. 1993) (same); FDIC v. Nihiser, 799 F. Supp.
904, 907 (C.D. 111. 1992) (same); FDIC v. Black, 777 F. Supp. 919 (W.D. Okla.
1991) (same). The Ninth Circuit stated in dicta that the savings clause preserved
any federal common law actions available prior to the enactment of § 1821(k).
FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 538 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting "other applica-
ble law" includes both state and federal common law).
A majority of the federal district courts also held that § 1821 (k) displaced fed-
eral common law actions for simple negligence. See, e.g., RTC v. Zimmerman, 853
F. Supp. 1016 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (concluding § 1821(k) displaces federal common
law simple negligence claims); FDIC v. Harrington, 844 F. Supp. 300, 304 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (same); RTC v. O'Bear, Overholser, Smith & Huffer, 840 F. Supp. 1270,
1270 (N.D. Ind. 1993) (same); FDIC v. Bates, 838 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (N.D. Ohio
1993) (same); RTC v. DiDomenico, 837 F. Supp. 623, 626 (D.N.J. 1993) (same);
FDIC v. Gonzalez-Gorrondona, 833 F. Supp. 1545, 1552 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (same);
RTC v. Farmer, 823 F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (same); RTC v. Hecht, 818 F.
Supp. 894, 910 (D. Md. 1993) (same); FDIC v. Mintz, 816 F. Supp. 1541, 1545 (S.D.
Fla. 1993); FDIC v. Brown, 812 F. Supp. 722, 726 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (same); RTC v.
Gallagher, 800 F. Supp. 595, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1992) (same); FDIC v. Barham, 794 F.
Supp. 187, 187 (W.D. La. 1991) (same); FDIC v. Miller, 781 F. Supp. 1271, 1275
(N.D. Ill. 1991) (same); FDIC v. Majalis, No. CIV.89-1316, 1991 WL 501602, at *1
(W.D. La. Nov. 1, 1991) (same).
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did not specify Congress's intent to preempt federal common law claims.93
Construing the statute to meet its objectives required the courts to con-
clude that federal common law actions survived § 1821 (k).9 4 Courts on
both sides of the issue have made convincing arguments to support their
opinions.9 5 Against this backdrop, the Third Circuit addressed the negli-
gence preemption issue in RTC v. CityFed Financial Corp.
IV. RTC v. CrT"YFS FINANCIAL CORP.
A. Factual Background
In RTC v. CityFed Financial Corp., two appeals were consolidated for
appellate review by the Third Circuit.9 6 The Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion ("RTC") brought individual recovery actions against former directors
and officers of two insolvent depository institutions. 97 The RTC based its
claims on simple and gross negligence and brought them under state law,
federal common law and § 1821 (k) of FIRREA. 98 The defendants moved
to dismiss the RTC's complaints on the grounds that § 1821 (k) either
93. See, e.g., Nihiser, 799 F. Supp. at 907 (finding .§ 1821 (k) does not preempt
federal common law causes of action).
94. See id. at 908 (finding language of § 1821(k) shows intent to preserve
rights under federal common law).
95. Battin, supra note 3, at 2361.
96. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1233.
97. Id. at 1235. The RTC was appointed receiver of United States Savings and
Loan and City Federal Savings Bank. Id. In both actions, the RTC alleged duty of
care violations in the directors' and officers' consideration, approval and oversight
of several large loans. Id. at 1236-37. In the United Savings action, the RTC al-
leged duty of care violations by:
(1) not hiring experienced lending underwriters or managers; (2) failing
to reduce underwriting guidelines to a written form; (3) approving large
loans after closing had already taken place; (4) maintaining inadequate
appraisal procedures . . . (5) failing to maintain adequate internal con-
trols; (6) not returning funds during the construction phase of commer-
cial properties pending issuance of final occupancy permits; and (7)
generally operating United Savings in an unsafe and unsound manner.
Id. at 1236. In the CityFed action, the RTC alleged duty of care violations by:
(1) failing to obtain and verify necessary financial information from bor-
rowers; (2) maintaining inadequate appraisal procedures; (3) consist-
ently loaning funds based on excessively high loan-to-value ratios... (4)
making imprudent long-range commitments to future lending or fund-
ing; (5) failing to monitor loan disbursements; (6) improperly waiving
risk limitations ... ; (7) failing to require and verify that necessary per-
mits and approvals were obtained... (8) improperly assessing the value
of guarantees given as security for the loans; and (9) not requiring adher-
ence to the Bank's lending policies and procedures.
Id. at 1237. In both actions, RTC did not allege any self dealing, fraud, bad faith or
conflict of interest by any of the defendants. Id. at 1236. The RTC alleged $12.7
million in damages in the United Savings action and $100 million in damages in
the City Federal action. Id.
98. Id. In the United Savings action, the RTC alleged breach of fiduciary duty
and simple negligence under NewJersey law and gross negligence under both New
Jersey law and § 1821 (k). Id. In the City Federal action, the RTC alleged breach of
17
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preempts state law or displaces federal common law. 99 The district court
held that § 1821 (k) does not preempt state law but does displace federal
common law.100 On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed in part and re-
versed in part.10 '
B. Narrative Analysis-Majority Opinion
In CityFed, the Third Circuit confronted the issue of whether
§ 1821(k) preempted state or federal common law.' 0 2 The Third Circuit
began its analysis of § 1821 (k) with the plain meaning of the statute.10 3
The court noted that the permissive construction of the term "may" sup-
ported its position.' 0 4 Because § 1821(k)'s savings clause used general
language, and because it was positioned at the end of the section, the
court concluded that Congress intended to preserve all other applicable
law.10
5
fiduciary duty and simple negligence under federal common law and gross negli-
gence under both federal common law and § 1821(k). Id. at 1237.
99. Id. at 1236-37. The United Savings defendants argued that § 1821(k)
preempts state law claims for simple negligence and accordingly moved to dismiss
these claims. Id. at 1236. The City Federal defendants argued that § 1821(k) dis-
places federal common law claims for simple negligence and moved to dismiss
only the simple negligence allegations. Id. at 1237.
100. Id. at 1236-37. The district court denied the United Savings defendants'
motion to dismiss and granted the City Federal defendants' motion to dismiss the
simple negligence claims. Id.
101. Id. at 1235, 1249. The Third Circuit held that § 1821(k) does not pre-
empt state law or displace federal common law simple negligence actions. Id.
Thus, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court's holding of no state law pre-
emption and reversed its holding finding federal common law displacement. Id. at
1249.
102. See id. at 1237 ("At issue in these appeals is whether Congress, by its en-
actment of § 1821(k) . . . preempted state law or displaced federal common law
actions that impose liability for conduct less culpable than gross negligence.").
103. Id. The Third Circuit noted that the language of § 1821(k) would be
conclusive unless Congress expressed a legislative intent to the contrary. Id. (citing
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)).
104. See id. at 1237-38 n.7 (noting Canfield and McSweeney interpreted term
"may" to be empowerment rather than limitation). The Third Circuit rejected the
defendants' view that "other applicable law" language in the savings clause was
intended to only preserve regulatory powers under other FIRREA sections. Id. at
1238. Referring to the pattern of usage of the savings clause terms throughout the
remainder of FIRREA, the court noted that Congress used specific language when
it referred to particular jurisdictions. Id.; see 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (3) (B) (1994) (re-
ferring to "powers imposed by state law"); 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (4) (referring to
"any other provision of Federal law, the law of any State, or the constitution of any
State").
105. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1238. The court cited two cases where general lan-
guage in the savings clause prevented preemption of other laws. Id.; see Patterson
v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (construing general savings clause broadly to per-
mit any relevant nonbankruptcy law); Reich v. Webb, 336 F.2d 153, 158 (9th Cir.
1964) (construing general savings clause of "any other law" to permit any common
law fiduciary duty claims). Furthermore, the positioning of the savings clause at
the end of § 1821(k) supports a broad, general savings clause interpretation. Ci-
1052 [Vol. 41: p. 1035
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The Third Circuit also found clear congressional intent for not using
§ 1821(k) to preempt any actions for simple negligence. 10 6 The original
drafts and revisions to § 1821 (k) also demonstrated Congress's intent not
to preempt simple negligence actions.10 7 Specifically, the court found
that the amendment, which replaced "negligence" with "gross negli-
gence," reflected Congress's attempt to reduce the amount of state law
preemption. 108
The Third Circuit used two legislative documents to support its deci-
sion of no simple negligence preemption. First, the court interpreted a
section-by-section report, prepared by the Senate Banking Committee, as
evidencing the Senate's intent to not preempt any claims for conduct less
culpable than gross negligence. 10 9 Second, the court found that a portion
tyFed, 57 F.3d at 1238 ("'[I] t is difficult to think of a more appropriate place to put
a general savings clause than where Congress placed it-at the conclusion of the section
setting out a special procedure for use in certain specified instances."') quoting
Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 145 (1967))).
106. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1239-42. The court recognized the context in which
Congress enacted FIRREA. Id. at 1238-39. The court noted that Van Gorkom
caused the deluge of state insulating legislation. Id. at 1239. At the same time,
however, federal regulators were trying to hold failed bank directors personally
liable in order to recover federal money. Id. Thus, FIRREA was enacted as a tool
to break through the state insulating legislation barrier. Id. The court also ex-
amined Congress's objectives. Id. The court cited the two primary goals of
"strengthen [ing] the enforcement powers of Federal regulators..." and to facili-
tate an effort to "seek out and punish those that have committed wrongdoing in
the management of the failed institutions." Id.; see Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 101 (9)-
(10), 103 Stat. 183 (1989); President's News Conference on Savings Crisis and Nominees,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1989, at D8. From this analysis, the court concluded that the
only plausible reading of § 1821(k) was that it placed a floor under bank directors
liability, rather than a ceiling. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1238-39.
107. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1239-40. Originally, the section provided a cause of
action against failed bank directors for any negligence available at common law.
Id. at 1240 (citing S774, 101st Cong. § 214(n) (1989)) (allowing "any cause of ac-
tion available at common law, including, but not limited to, negligence"). Con-
gress amended § 1821(k) amidst concerns that highly qualified individuals would
avoid potential directorships. Id. at 1240.
108. Id. The bill's floor manager, Senator Riegle, described the purpose of
the amendment: "'The reported bill totally preempted state law in this area ....
However, in light of the state law implications raised by this provision, the man-
ager's amendment.'" Id. (quoting 135 CONG. REc. 7152-53 (daily ed. April 19,
1989)). Accordingly, the court rejected the defendants' contention that the
amendment evinced an intent to establish a federal policy of attracting competent
directors. Id. ("We reject this 'revisionism."').
109. Id. at 1241; see also 135 CONG. REc. S6907-34 (daily ed. June 19, 1989)
("This subsection does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under State law or
other applicable Federal law, if such law permits the officers or directors of a financial
institution to be sued (1) for violating a lower standard of care, such as simple negli-
gence." (emphasis added)). The court noted that both Houses had access to the
report before they passed the final version of FIRREA, even though it was unavaila-
ble before the initial version. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241. The court rejected the
defendants' argument that the report should not be relied upon because it was
post-enactment legislative history. Id. The defendants relied upon Clarke v. Securi-
ties Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987), where the Supreme Court discounted a state-
NOTE 10531996]
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of the Conference Report supported its interpretation of Congress's
intent.' 1 0
The Third Circuit discredited the two unsuccessful attempts to amend
§ 1821(k) to provide for simple negligence actions."' Instead, the court
asserted that these amendments attempted to clarify the § 1821 (k) pre-
ment in the congressional record after the law had already passed. Id. at 407. The
Third Circuit, however, distinguished Clarke on the facts because Congress had the
report before it in passing the final version of FIRREA, whereas the Clarke state-
ment was not available to Congress in passing the statute. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241.
Also, the Third Circuit noted the FIRREA report was prepared by the same com-
mittee that originated the provision rather than by an impartial commentator. Id.
110. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241. The portion of the FIRREA Conference Report
in question was:
Title II preempts State law with respect to claims brought by the FDIC in
any capacity against officers and directors of an insured depository insti-
tution. The preemption allows the FDIC to pursue claims for gross negli-
gence or any conduct that demonstrates a greater disregard of a duty of
care, including intentional tortious conduct.
Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 222, 101st Cong. at 437, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N.
432). The court read the first sentence of this portion as merely describing the
limited preemptive scope of § 1821(k). Id. Thus, the court reasoned that Con-
gress intended to preempt state insulating statutes. Id. Furthermore, the second
sentence reiterated the point that § 1821(k) allowed gross negligence actions in
states which previously precluded these actions. Id. The court, however, cited no
limiting language that prevented simple negligence actions. Id. (citing FDIC v.
McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 539 (9th Cir. 1992); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 448
n.6 (10th Cir. 1992)).
111. Id. at 1241-42. Because these failed attempts constituted post-enactment
legislative history, they "should be afforded little or no weight, especially in the
face of contradictory contemporaneous legislative history." Id. at 1242. The court
adopted the language injustice Scalia's concurrence in Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496
U.S. 617 (1990), regarding the minimal weight that should be given to post-enact-
ment legislative history. Scalia stated: "'Subsequent legislative history'-which
presumably means the post-enactment history of a statute's consideration and en-
actment-is a contradiction in terms .... Arguments based on subsequent legis-
lative history.., should not be taken seriously, not even in a footnote." CityFed, 57
F.3d at 1242 (quoting Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631-32 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part)). The Third Circuit found it was settled law that little or no
weight should be applied to post-enactment legislative history. Id.; see United
States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 535 n.4 (1993) (noting "subsequent legislative history
is a 'hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier' Congress" (quoting Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990))). The ration-
ale was that the intent of post-enactment legislative history was not a reliable
reflection of the intent of the original enacting Congress. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1242.
Thus, relying on the post-enactment amendment attempts would improperly result
in finding original congressional intent to preempt simple negligence actions. See
id. (noting that giving weight to post-enactment legislative history could lead to
court "improperly draw[ing] inferences from unsuccessful Congressional attempts
to clarify ambiguities which Congress did not perceive at the time of enactment").
The Third Circuit rejected the contention that the two failed post-enactment ef-
forts to preserve simple negligence actions evidenced an original congressional
intent to preempt such actions. Id. at 1241-42.
1054
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emption issue in response to conflicting federal courts decisions.1 12 Addi-
tionally, in analyzing the legislative history of § 1821 (k) and FIRREA, the
Third Circuit emphasized Congress's purpose of strengthening the recov-
ery and enforcement powers of federal receivers. 113 From this legislative
history, the court concluded that Congress intended § 1821 (k) to preempt
existing state insulating statutes."l 4 The court also concluded that a uni-
form gross negligence standard of liability did not coincide with Con-
gress's intent." 5
1. State Law Preemption
In CityFed, the court decided the issue of state law preemption primar-
ily on the basis of common law preemption principles. 1" 6 The Supremacy
Clause in the United States Constitution provided for preemption of state
laws by acts of Congress when Congress intends to "supplant state author-
ity in a particular area" or when state laws conflict or "stand[ ] as an obsta-
cle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress.""17
Following this rule, the court concluded that Congress did not pre-
empt state law actions for simple negligence."18 In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Third Circuit also adopted several arguments from the Ninth and
112. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241-42 ("The fact that Congress subsequently sought
to clarify the limited preemptive intent of § 1821(k) in the face of conflicting judi-
cial interpretations is not surprising.").
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. (noting "[t] he intent of Congress was to strengthen, not weaken,
the [federal bank receivers'] hand in pursuit of directors and officers").
116. Id. at 1242-43. The Third Circuit also used two Courts of Appeals deci-
sions as persuasive authority. Id. at 1243-44 (mentioning Canfield and McSweeney
courts).
117. Id. at 1243 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). The Third Circuit noted this con-
gressional intent can be either explicit or implicit. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (noting implied congressional intent to preempt is
evident if federal regulatory scheme is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement it.").
Congressional preemption of state law is premised on the Supremacy Clause.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... shall be the Supreme Law of the
Land."); see Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991)
(" [S] tate laws that 'interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in
pursuance of the constitution' are invalid." (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824))).
118. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1243. Because the court determined the statutory lan-
guage and legislative history of § 1821(k) established an intent to strengthen the
receivers' power of recovery, it thereby concluded that simple negligence actions
were intended as a supplemental power. Id. (concluding "Congress intended to
leave room for state law to supplement § 1821 (k)"). Additionally, the court found
§ 1821(k) did not conflict with state law simple negligence actions because of the
congressional intent to expand the RTC's and FDIC's recovery powers. Id.
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Tenth Circuits to further support its decision.1 19 The Third Circuit
agreed that Congress did not intend § 1821(k) to be a national liability
standard. 120 The court reasoned that because Congress did not attempt
to define gross negligence by one standard, a national uniform standard
of liability could not result.1 2 1
Moreover, the Third Circuit noted that an unintended anomaly
would occur if Congress preempted simple negligence actions.' 22 The
court also rejected the argument that potential § 1821(k) liability would
deter bank executives from their own intentional misconduct. 123 The
court noted that directors and officers were frequently advised about their
legal obligations and potential exposure to personal liability.12 4 Thus, a
national-standard interpretation would encourage these executives to en-
gage in simple negligence. 125 Based on this concern and its own preemp-
tion analysis, the court concluded the RTC could assert any available state
law simple negligence actions against the former bank executives. 12 6
119. Id. at 1243-44. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis, see supra
notes 102-66 and accompanying text.
120. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1243-44. Because the statute defined gross negligence
by the appropriate state law definition, § 1821(k) could not establish a national
standard of gross negligence. Id.; see FDIC v. McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532, 539 (9th
Cir. 1992) ("Nowhere does FIRREA indicate an aim to create national uniformity
.... "); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443, 447 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Nowhere does the
statute announce its intention to create a national standard of liability .... ").
There was no one universal definition of gross negligence for § 1821(k) to adopt,
even if Congress had intended as such. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1243 ("'There is no
generally accepted meaning [of gross negligence]."' (quoting W. PAGE KEETON,
PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984))). The Third
Circuit stated, "'the statute cannot possibly, even without the [savings clause], cre-
ate a national standard of liability."' Id. (quoting Canfield, 967 F.2d at 447).
121. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1243-44.
122. Id. at 1244. If only gross negligence actions were valid against failed
bank executives, then they would seek the protection of § 1821(k) by allowing
their bank to continue to financially decline into bankruptcy. Id. The court re-
ferred to the Canfield court's remarks where this problem was described as follows:
"Prior to failure, liability would attach for simple negligence .... As the institution
struggles, therefore, section 1821 (k) would create an incentive for the officers and
directors to allow the bank to fail. It simply cannot be that FIRREA would indi-
rectly encourage such behavior." Canfield, 967 F.2d at 449. Such conduct would
be inconsistent with the clear purposes of FIRREA. See McSweeney, 976 F.2d at 540
(noting preempting simple negligence actions "would lead to absurd results, creat-
ing [a] 'perverse incentive for a director ... to permit the thrift to fall into ruin"'
(quoting FDIC v. McSweeney, 772 F. Supp. 1154, 1159 (S.D. Cal. 1991))).
123. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1244. Assuming that bank directors and officers were
aware of the § 1821(k) standard, they "would undoubtedly be aware that federal
receivership would insulate them from claims of negligence." Id.
124. Id. The existence of the directors' argument that a simple negligence is
evidence of an awareness of the § 1821(k) standard on their part. Id.
125. Id. The directors would have an incentive to "engage in conduct, which
the RTC could not necessarily prove rises to the level of intentional misconduct or
gross negligence, but which nonetheless placed the institution at greater risk of
receivership." Id.
126. Id.
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2. Federal Common Law Displacement
The Third Circuit followed a similar analytical approach in address-
ing the issue of federal common law displacement. 127 The court inter-
preted congressional intent through the statutory language and legislative
history of § 1821 (k).128 In interpreting the plain language of the savings
clause of § 1821 (k), the court focused on the preservation of "any right of
the Corporation. '129 The court construed the plain language of
§ 1821(k) as preserving federal common law actions brought by federal
receivers against failed bank executives. 130 Furthermore, the court re-
jected the contention that the savings clause only refers to FIRREA en-
forcement powers outside § 1821 (k). 1 31
The Third Circuit also rejected the application of the "spoke directly"
test because it did not stand alone.1 32 The court noted that the Supreme
Court was consistent with its own approach, but the presence of congres-
sional intent in the CityFed case was the distinguishing factor.13 3 Because
127. Id. at 1245 ("The answer to the question of federal common law displace-
ment, like state law preemption, must turn, in the first instance, on an interpreta-
tion of congressional intent, looking to the text of the statute and then to its
legislative history.").
128. Id. at 1244-45. Adopting the Supreme Court's language in Milwaukee,
the Third Circuit stated, "it is unnecessary to find that Congress 'had affirmatively
proscribed the use of federal common law."' Id. at 1244 (quoting Milwaukee v.
Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 (1981)). The court added, however, "'any terms of the
statute explicitly preserving or preempting judge-made law are of course control-
ling."' Id. (quoting In re Complaint of Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 339 (2d
Cir. 1981)).
129. Id. at 1245. Recall, the savings clause of § 1821(k) provides "[n]othing
in this paragraph shall impair or affect any right of the Corporation under other
applicable law." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994). Federal receivers have the same
rights as the failed bank upon receivership. O'Melveny & Meyers v. FDIC, 114 S.
Ct. 2048, 2054 (1994). Thus, they obtain the right to bring actions under the
federal common law. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1245.
130. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1245.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1245-46. In Milwaukee v. Illinois, the Supreme Court established a
test to be used to determine whether a federal statute displaces federal common
law. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 304. If a federal statute does not explicitly address the
issue of federal common law displacement, the statute displaces the federal com-
mon law if the legislative scheme spoke directly to the question previously ad-
dressed by federal common law or if the statute "occupied the field through the
establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program." Id. at 315, 317. In that
case, the Court held that amendments to a federal statute displaced the federal
common law because they spoke directly to the claim previously addressed by fed-
eral common law. Id. at 304.
133. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1245 (noting Supreme Court first evaluated
whether federal statute spoke directly to previously-covered federal common law
claim and examined scope of legislation). The Third Circuit stated "we do not
believe the Supreme Court's opinion... is inconsistent with our approach." Id.
The Court in Milwaukee applied the "spoke directly" test only after first concluding
the federal statute contained no congressional intent to preserve federal common
law. Id. In the case at bar, however, the Third Circuit found congressional intent
for § 1821(k) not to displace federal common law through interpretation of the
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the precondition to applying the "spoke directly" test was not met, the
court concluded this analysis was not appropriate.13 4
Furthermore, because Congress did not intend to create an "anoma-
lous situation," § 1821(k) did not speak directly to the standard of care
previously covered by federal common law.13 5 A national uniform stan-
dard of gross negligence would provide greater protection to directors
and officers in the event that their banks become insolvent.1 3 6 Congress
did not want to encourage executives of failing banks to allow their institu-
tions to become bankrupt so that they could limit their personal liabil-
ity. m3 7 Moreover, assuming the federal common law standard involves
gross negligence, Congress did not intend to establish a national post-re-
ceivership standard while the pre-receivership standard remained
unclear. 13 8
The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that the exhaustive
scope of FIRREA evinced a Congressional intent to displace the federal
common law. 139 In contrast, the court found nothing in § 1821(k)'s plain
savings clause. Also, the court read the Senate Report as clearly expressing con-
gressional intent to preserve federal common law actions for simple negligence.
Id. at 1245-46; see CONG. REc. S6912 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) (stating "this subsec-
tion does not prevent the FDIC from pursuing claims under ... other Federal law
... for ... simple negligence").
134. CityFed 57 F.3d at 1246. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit held that
§ 1821 (k) would not pass the "spoke directly" test even if it applied. Id. The court
reasoned that in enacting § 1821, Congress only spoke directly to the standard of
care for directors and officers in states where the federal receivers were confronted
with state insulating legislation. Id. Section 1821(k) was necessary for the federal
receivers to bring gross negligence actions in states with such protective legislation.
Id. at 1242. Congress did not intend § 1821(k) to speak directly to the standard of
care for bank executives previously governed by federal common law because the
statute did not provide for one definition of gross negligence. Id. In cases where
the bank was federally chartered, such as the one at bar, "no state law standard is
'applicable' since federal law governs the liability of such individuals." Id. Accord-
ing to the court, Congress would have provided a definition if it had intended to
displace. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. For a discussion of a national uniform standard of gross negligence,
see infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
137. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1242. The Third Circuit added "[ilf Congress had
intended to codify a federal standard of liability.., it would not have limited its
application to circumstances where the institution entered receivership." Id.
138. For a discussion of the rationale behind the CityFed court's holding of
no preemption under § 1821(k), see supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
Id. at 1246-47.
The CityFed court recognized the debate over whether the pre-receivership
federal common law standard is one of simple or gross negligence, due in part to
the ambiguity of the decision in Briggs v. Spaulding. Id. at 1247 n.16. The court
declined to resolve the question of what standard of liability is provided for in
federal common law. Id. The RTC should be allowed to assert a claim for negli-
gence under the existing federal common law, even if the standard is interpreted
to be simple negligence. Id.
139. Id. at 1247. Although FIRREA created several regulatory agencies and
granted them numerous enforcement powers, the statute was not intended to be a
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language or the legislative history of FIRREA that indicated a congres-
sional intent to enact such a comprehensive program. 140 Instead, the
court concluded that § 1821 (k) represents a supplementary power to, for
example, federal common law powers to sue failed bank executives for
negligence. 14 1 Therefore, Congress limited the scope of FIRREA to
merely preempting state insulating legislation.1 42
The Third Circuit agreed with the Seventh and Tenth Circuits that
§ 1821 (k) did not preempt state law actions, but disagreed with their dis-
placement of federal common law actions for simple negligence.1 43 The
plain language of § 1821(k) and its legislative history demonstrated that
Congress did not intend to apply § 1821(k) to federally chartered
banks.1 44 As a result, the court in CityFed overcame the presumption of
federal law displacement. 14
5
The court also rejected the argument that construing § 1821(k) to
allow federal simple negligence actions would invalidate § 1821 (k)'s gross
"wholesale [displacement] of longstanding principles of corporate governance."
135 CONG. REc. S6912, at 7151 (daily ed. June 19, 1989) (statement of Sen. San-
ford). Senator Sanford further noted that § 1821(k) did not "represent a major
step in the direction of establishing . . . Federal standards of care of corporate
officers and directors." Id.; see CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1247 (disussing Senator Sanford's
opinion about § 1821(k)). The defendants' reliance on the reasoning in Milwau-
kee was not appropriate because in that case there were several express statements
regarding the comprehensiveness of the federal legislation. CityFed, 57 F.3d at
1247; see Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 319 (1981) (noting Senate Report
which stated, "[t]he 'major purpose' of the Amendment was 'to establish a compre-
hensive long-range policy."' (quoting S. REP. No. 92-414, at 95)).
140. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1247.
141. Id. (noting court cannot conclude "that Congress intended to occupy
the field and supplant existing powers already available as a matter of federal com-
mon law").
142. Id. at 1248. "To read any more into the enactment of § 1821(k) would
'make traps of its word' [because] Congress intended this provision to strengthen,
not weaken, the RTC's ability to recover for director and officer misconduct."
RTC v. Chapman, 29 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir 1994) (Posner, J., dissenting)).
143. See, e.g., RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 297 (10th Cir. 1995) (agreeing that
state law was not preempted); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1994)
(agreeing that federal common law actions were preempted); RTC v. Miramon, 22
F.3d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that federal common law was preempted);
RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting federal common law
was preempted). CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1248. The CityFed court noted that these
courts explained the distinction based on the need for stronger evidence of Con-
gress's intent to displace federal common law as opposed to preempting state law.
Id. (citing Seventh Circuit's rationale that federalism concerns require greater con-
gressional to preempt state law than to displace federal common law and therefore
"'same sort of evidence of clear and manifest purpose is not required."' (quoting
Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316))). The Third Circuit agreed with this proposition, but
did not apply it to the present case. Id. at 1248 (noting certain instances which
required application of presumption would result in statute preempting state law
but not displacing federal common law).
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negligence standard. 146 Because many states have insulating statutes, fed-
eral receivers need § 1821 (k) to bring a negligence action for conduct less
culpable than intentional misconduct. 14 7 The court noted that allowing
federal common law actions would ensure that directors and officers
would be held accountable for conduct less culpable than intentional mis-
conduct, regardless of where the bank was chartered. 148 Therefore, the
court concluded that § 1821(k) did not preempt simple negligence ac-
tions based on either state or federal common law. 149
C. Dissenting Opinion
CircuitJudge Mansmann agreed that simple negligence actions based
on state law were not preempted by § 1821 (k). 150 Judge Mansmann dis-
agreed, however, with the majority by stating § 1821 (k) displaced federal
common law actions.15 1 Judge Mansmann believed the majority's inter-
pretations of the statute's plain language and legislative history were erro-
neous.1 52 Furthermore, she articulated that § 1821(k) established an
exclusive national standard of liability for gross negligence in suits involv-
146. Id. (noting Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits relied, in significant part, on
this argument). The Seventh Circuit stated that "[it is illogical that Congress in-
tended in one sentence to establish a gross negligence standard of liability and in
the next sentence to eviscerate that standard by allowing actions under federal
common law for simple negligence." Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 420. Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit claimed that such an interpretation would render § 1821(k)'s gross negli-
gence standard "redundant, meaningless surplusage." Bates, 42 F.3d at 372.
147. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1249. The Fifth Circuit asked: "Why would [federal
receivers] ever bring an action under section 1821 (k) where it would have to prove
gross negligence, when it could bring an action under the federal common law
and only be required to prove simple negligence?" Miramon, 22 F.3d at 1361. The
Third Circuit responded by noting that federal common law is not applicable to
state-chartered banks, therefore § 1821(k) is necessary to overcome any state insu-
lating legislation. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1249. The court cited RTC v. Chapman for the
conclusion that the forum where corporation is chartered is the applicable law
governing liability of directors and officers. Id. Thus, § 1821(k) would not be
meaningless because all federal common law claims would be barred by the state
insulating statutes and § 1821(k) would be the only available gross negligence
claims. Id.
148. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1249. The court admitted that § 1821(k) would have
no relevance when the bank was federally-chartered because a stricter federal com-
mon law simple negligence action would be available. Id. Instead, this result re-
flects the intent behind § 1821(k) of ensuring that state-chartered banks'
executives are not insulated from negligence actions. Id. Thus, allowing simple
negligence actions based on federal common law "was precisely the purpose un-
derlying the enactment of § 1821(k)." Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann's opinion joins the two
Courts of Appeals that addressed both state and federal preemption questions like
the Third Circuit. The Seventh and Tenth Circuits held that § 1821(k) does not
preempt state law actions but does displace federal common law actions. Id.
(Mansmann, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
152. Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting).
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ing federally-chartered bank executives.' 5 ' As such, Judge Mansmann
noted that more evidence of congressional intent was needed to displace
federal common law than to preempt state law.15 4 Moreover, she noted
that Congress displaced federal common law when it "speak [s] directly" to
the issue previously governed by the federal common law. 155
Unlike the majority, Judge Mansmann interpreted the substantive
portion of § 1821(k) as establishing a gross negligence standard in the
area previously governed by federal common law. 15 6  Thus, Judge
Mansmann joined the other circuits and construed the § 1821(k) savings
clause as not preserving federal common law actions for simple negli-
gence. 15 7 Further, Judge Mansmann disagreed with the conclusion that
153. See id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting conclusion would align him-
self with Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Circuits); RTC v. Frates, 52 F.3d 295, 296
(10th Cir. 1995) (applying gross negligence standard); FDIC v. Bates, 42 F.3d 369,
371 (6th Cir. 1994) (establishing gross negligence standard for federal cause of
action); RTC v. Miramon, 22 F.3d 1357, 1364-65 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying gross
negligence standard to former bank officers); RTC v. Gallagher, 10 F.3d 416, 418
(7th Cir. 1993) (applying gross negligence standard to former bank officer's
breach of duty).
154. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1250 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann
adopted the language of the Supreme Court and stated that "'the historic police
powers of the States are not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (quoting
Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981) (citations omitted)). In federal
common law displacement cases, however, "it is for Congress, not federal courts to
articulate the appropriate standars to be applied as a matter of law." Milwaukee,
451 U.S. at 317 (footnote omitted). In connection with this assumption, Judge
Mansmann noted that federal common law is a "'necessary expedient,' resorted to
in the absence of a federal statute and is 'subject to the paramount authority of
Congress."' CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1250 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (quoting Milwau-
kee, 451 U.S. at 313-14) (citations omitted)).155. CityFe, 57 F.3d at 1250 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (citing United States
v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993)). Judge Mansmann disgreed with the majority
and found that the "spoke directly" test applied to the present case and concluded
tht federal common law was displaced. Id. at 1250-52 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
Through an analysis of § 1821(k) 's plain language, she found Congress spoke di-
rectly to the standard of liability of failed bank executives. Id. at 1250 (Mansmann,
J., dissenting).
156. See id. at 1250 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (noting "[t]hus, that Congress
has spoken directly to the standard of liability for the directors and officers of all
failed federally-insured depository institutions . . . is, I believe, not open to ques-
tion"); see also 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k) (1994) (providing "[a] director or officer ...
may be held personally liable . . . for gross negligence").
157. Id. at 1250-51 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Such an interpretation
avoided rendering § 1821 (k) as "meaningless surplusage." Id. at 1251 (Mansmann,
J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann also disagreed that the savings clause was clear
on its face. Id. at 1250 (Mansmann,J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann could prop-
erly interpret its meaning only after referring to the legislative history. Id. at 1250
n.4 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Judge Mansmann argued that the
majority opinion contradicted itself by finding that § 1821(k) did not address the
standard of liability of bank executives while also holding that § 1821 (k) preserved
simple federal negligence actions. Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (claiming "[t]he
majority can not have it both ways; either section 1821(k) addresses the issue or it
does not"). Judge Mansmann also did not agree that the substantive provision of
1996] NOTE 1061
27
Lam: Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cityfed Financial Corp.: The State Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
1062 VILLANovA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41: p. 1035
§ 1821 (k) exclusively applied to state-chartered banks. 158 She asserted tht
Congress would have referred to "state" depository institutions if it in-
tended to have § 1821 (k) apply only to state-chartered banks.159 The ma-
jority opinion on the other hand displaced federal common law because
they believedCongress intended to apply § 1821 (k) to all banks. 160 Judge
Mansmann found the state law reference to indicate that courts should
define gross negligence, in federally-chartered bank cases, by the law of
the state most closely connected to the subject bank.16 1
In analying § 1821(k)'s legislative history, Judge Mansmann con-
cluded that Congress ultimately adopted § 1821(k) to establish a federal
standard of care at gross negligence. 162 The passage of § 1821 (k) involved
an evolution of liability from simple to gross negligence. 16 3 Further, the
two post-enactment amendments attempting to permit simple negligence
actions, evinced Congress's intent to eliminate the federal common
law. 164 Finally, Judge Mansmann argued that the majority overempha-
sized the more stringent pre-receivership standard as compared to the
§ 1821(k) applied only to state-chartered banks and the savings clause applied to
both state and federally-charrtered banks. Id. at 1251 n.5 (Mansmann, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Mansmann found no support for this view in either the plain language
or legislative history. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1251-52 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). For support, she noted that
FIRREA distinguished between state and federally-chartered banks, yet § 1821(k)
merely referred to banks generally. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting); 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1813(c)(4), (5), 1821(k).
159. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1251 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1251-52 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann also speci-
fied that defining gross negligence by the applicable state law did not create the
serious problem that the majority suggested. Id. at 1246 (claiming "[t]o read
[§ 1821(k) as supplanting] federal common law would be to create an additional
(and serious) problem, because it is unclear which formulation of gross negligence
... appl[ies]").
161. Id. (noting this suggestion is "sensible and reasonable" because
"[c]oncepts of negligence fall squarely within the province of the state courts").
162. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1252-54 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting Senate removed sim-
ple negligence standard in § 1821(k) and House approved of removal and enacted
form contained gross negligence language). Thus, the gross negligence standard
was what both Houses agreed on in § 1821(k), and they rejected the simple negli-
gence standard. Id. at 1254 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (citing House-Senate Con-
ference Report for confirmation of gross negligence standard (H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 222, 101st Cong., at 398 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 432, 437)).
164. Id. at 1254-55 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann realized
that post-enactment legislative history should not be given as much weight as pre-
enactment history, however Supreme Court language demonstrated that she
"would 'be remiss' to ignore it." Id. at 1254 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (citing
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 687 n.7 (1979)). Judge Mansmann
concluded, "had Congress preserved the federal common law standard in section
1821(k), as the majority contends, these amendments would not have been neces-
sary." Id. at 1255 (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
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post-receivership standard. 165 She noted that this discrepancy represents
a problem for Congress, not the courts, to redress. 166
D. Critical Analysis
The Supreme Court established standards to decide whether a federal
statute preempted state law or displaced federl common law in Milwaukee
v. Illinois.16 7 Different levels of congressional intent are required to pre-
empt or displace such pre-existing law. 168 The Third Circuit majority
properly recognized this distinction, as well as the Supreme Court's in-
struction to apply the different standards.1 69 It erred, however, in sum-
marily dismissing the applicability of Milwaukee.1 70
1. State Law Preemption-Majority Opinion
The Third Circuit correctly concluded that § 1821(k) did not pre-
empt state law. In the process, however, the court drew several questiona-
ble conclusions. The court analyzed the plain language and the legislative
history to determine if Congress intended § 1821(k) to be the exclusive
standard of liability or if it was meant to be supplemented by some other
law.' 7 1 The Third Circuit's conclusion that Congress intended § 1821(k)
to preserve state law actions goes beyond the requirements of Milwau-
kee.172 The Third Circuit should have used Milwaukee to shift the burden
165. Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann contended that direc-
tors and officers would not permit their banks to become insolvent solely to obtain
§1821(k)'s gross negligence standard. Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (noting "the
public policy consideration the majority raises regarding the 'perverse incentive'
... may be more imagined than real").
166. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (citing FMC Corp. v. United States Dep't
of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3d Cir. 1994)).
167. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
168. Id. at 315-17. Displacing federal common law requires a lesser showing
of congressional intent than that required to preempt state law. Id. (noting dis-
tinction based on assumption of not interfering with states' police powers, which is
not present in federal common law displacement issue). Thus, federal common
law is displaced if there is congressional intent to merely "speak directly" to the
issue which the federal common law previously governed. Id. at 315.
169. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1248.
170. See id. The viability of Milwaukee rendered the holding of no federal
common law displacement implausible. Id.
171. Id. at 1237-49.
172. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (defining test
for determining whether federal statutory law governs question previously subject
to federal common law). The Supreme Court described its state law preemption
test as follows: "When considering state law preemption, 'we start with the assump-
tion that the historic police powers of the States are not to be superseded by the
Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."' Id. (em-
phasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, it appears the test creates a presumption
against preempting state law. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1248 (recognizing Milwaukee as
establishing presumption in favor of displacing federal common law). Because the
issue involved federal displacement of state law, the test enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Milwaukee applied to the facts of CityFed. See also Milwaukee, 451
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of proof to Congress to demonstrate that their "clear and manifest pur-
pose" in enacting § 1821 (k) involved preempting state law. 1 73 If the court
found that Congress did not meet this onerous burden, § 1821(k) would
not preempt the state law.
The court's findings regarding preemption was consistent with its in-
terpretations of the plain language of § 1821(k) and its legislative his-
tory.174 Because the savings clause preserves "all other applicable law,"
Congress did not intend § 1821 (k) to be an exclusive standard of liabil-
ity.175 Furthermore, by analyzing the legislative history, the Third Circuit
concluded that Congress primarily enacted § 1821 (k) to preempt state in-
sulating statutes, not to preempt simple negligence actions. 176 The legis-
lative history, however, lacked clarity.177 Thus, the CityFed court drew
weak conclusions in its attempt to support its interpretations regarding
§ 1821 (k)'s legislative history. 178 Specifically, the court misinterpreted the
U.S. at 1243-44 ("Congress intended to leave room for state law to supplement
§ 1821(k).").
173. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 316 (preempting state law).
174. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1237-43 (noting that federal law preempts state
law). The court pieced together various Supreme Court decisions to form a rule
that indicates when federal law preempts state law. Id. The other circuits that
addressed the state law preemption issue did not use this rule. See, e.g., FDIC v.
McSweeney, 976 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that state law is not preempted
by federal law); FDIC v. Canfield, 967 F.2d 443 (10th Cir. 1992) (same). Instead,
these courts performed a pure statutory interpretation analysis. See McSweeney, 976
F.2d at 536-41 (construing statute to allow use of federal and state law); Canfield,
967 F.2d at 445-52 (construing statute to not preempt state statutory claims).
175. See id. at 1239-40 (acknowledging state law applies as well). The Ninth
and Tenth Circuits went further and found that the substantive portion of
§ 1821(k) also evinced an intent to supplement the statute's standard. See Mc-
Sweeney, 976 F.2d at 537-38 (noting that nothing precludes FDIC from seeking rem-
edies available under state law); Canfield, 967 F.2d at 446 (same). The Third
Circuit adopted other arguments from these circuits except this point. See CityFed,
57 F.3d at 1243-44 (adopting statutory interpretation and public policy argu-
ments). The lack of plain language analysis reflects the Third Circuit's hesitancy
to emphasize the face of the statute. The court merely discussed two aspects of the
plain language of § 1821(k).
176. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241 (discussing legislative history of § 1821(k)).
177. See Gorman, supra note 4, at 669-70, 679 (discussing legislative history of
§ 1821(k)). The Senate Report stated simple negligence claims survived § 1821 (k)
while the House Conference Committee stated § 1821(k) establishes a national
gross negligence standard. Id.; see also 135 CONC. REC. S6912 (daily ed. June 19,
1989); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-222, at 398, reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.CA.N. at 437
(discussing the establishment of a negligence standard).
178. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1238-42 (interpreting § 1821(k)'s legislative his-
tory). For example, the Senate Report involved post-enactment legislative history
and is "not entitled to substantial weight." Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421 (discussing
weight that should be given to post-enactment legislative history). This position is
also held by the Sixth and Fifth Circuits. See Bates, 42 F.3d at 372 (applying simple
negligence standard and applying court's construction in Gallagher); Miramon, 22
F.3d at 1362 (giving no substantial weight to post enactment legislative history). By
treating the report as if it were published before the voting occured, the court
justified its reliance on a vague distinction between publication and having a re-
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intent of the Conference Report.1 79 Therefore, the Third Circuit wrote
an ambiguous opinion because it hopelessly attempted to locate an af-
firmitive congressional intent not to preempt state law. The court should
have adopted stronger reasoning by concluding that § 1821 (k) is too am-
biguous to overcome the Milwaukee presumption against state law
preemption.
2. Federal Common Law Displacement-Majority Opinion
The majority used this state law preemption analysis to support its
conclusion that Congress did not displace federal common law actions.18 0
Consistent with its earlier findings, the court concluded the savings clause
explicitly preserved federal common law actions.1 81 Similarly, the court
found that the legislative history evinced an intent not to displace federal
common law actions.1 8 2
The court, however, incorrectly distinguished Milwaukee by not apply-
ing the "speak directly" test.18 3 Nevertheless, the court's basis for hypo-
thetically concluding that § 1821 (k) did not meet the "speak directly" test
coincided with its holding that Congress did not displace federal common
law actions for simple negligence. 184 Because the court found Congress
port "before it." CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1241. In fact, the Third Circuit is the only
circuit to give weight to this late report.
179. See Gallagher, 10 F.3d at 421 (noting Congress intended gross negligence
to be agreed-upon standard); Gorman, supra note 4, at 670 (noting report implies
intent to establish uniform gross negligence standard).
180. CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1244-49. The dissent, however, argued that § 1821 (k)
displaced federal common law because the state law preemption analysis used by
the majority is inappropriate in federal displacement questions. Id. at 1249
(Mansmann, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1245.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1248 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (noting that Milwaukees "speak
directly" test governed and that majority should apply it). Judge Mansmann ex-
plained that federal common law is merely "resorted to in the absence of a federal
statute and is 'subject to the paramount authority of Congress"' Id. (Mansmann,
J., dissenting). Thus, Milwaukee mandates that federal common law is displaced
when Congress "speaks directly" to that issue. Id. (Mansmann, J., dissenting).
Moreover, the Milwaukee test applied because the only difference between the
present case and Milwaukee involved the existence of congressional intent in this
case. Id. at 1245. The Milwaukee court applied the "speak directly" test after it
concluded no congressional intent to preserve the federal common law was pres-
ent. Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 327-32. This distinction fails because the CityFed court
found congressional intent only after interpreting notoriously ambiguous statutory
language and legislative history.
184. See CityFed, 57 F.3d at 1245-46 (noting § 1821(k) was not enacted to de-
fine standard of care applicable to federally chartered institutions governed by
federal common law). After dismissing the applicability of the "speak directly" test,
the court stated, "we do not believe ... that § 1821(k) 'spoke directly' to the stan-
dard of care." Id. at 1246. The dissent concluded, however, that § 1821(k) spoke
directly to the standard of liability previously addressed by federal common law.
Id. at 1252 (Mansmann, J., dissenting) (noting wat "speaking directly" standard is
applied). Judge Mansmann interpreted the plain language as clearly applying to
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enacted § 1821(k) only to preempt state insulating statutes, it concluded
that § 1821 (k) did not address the standard of liability currently governed
by federal common law. 185 The court, however, failed to note that the




The savings and loan crisis of the 1980s prompted Congress to hur-
riedly enact remedial legislation to aid federal regulators in recovering
federal monies. 18 7 This pressure to confer greater powers upon the RTC
and FDIC caused congressional debate concerning the need to attract
competent directors, to what extent Congress may preempt state law and
what standard of liability would apply to directors and officers of failed
banks. The haste to enact FIRREA left some of these issues unresolved.
both state and federally chartered institutions. Id. at 1250 (Mansmann, J., dissent-
ing). Also, the savings clause of § 1821(k) must not preserve federal common law
actions in order to prevent the substance provisions from becoming "meaningless
surplusage and rendered a nullity." Id. at 1250-51 (Mansmann,J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing tthe clarity of the savings clause).
185. Id. The court stated that "While portions of FIRREA were encacted to
govern both state and federally chartered institutions .... § 1821(k) was simply not
enacted to define the standard of care applicable to federally chartered institu-
tions governed by federal common law." Id.
The dissent took a more plausible approach because it recognized that a
greater level of congressional intent was needed to preempt state laws than to dis-
place the federal common law. Instead of making its own affirmitive conclusions
regarding the meaning of the plain language or Congress's intent, the dissent criti-
cized the majority's interpretation. See id. at 1250-52 (Mansmann, J., dissenting)
(criticizing majority's: (1) interpretation of savings clause as clearly preserving fed-
eral common law actions, (2) view that § 1821(k) does not address standard of
liability of federally chartered banks and (3) position that lack of gross negligence
definition in § 1821(k) shows Congress's intent to displace federal common law).
The dissent appropriately conceded that any affirmitive interpretation of this am-
biguous statute and its confusing legislative history could be easily refuted. Be-
cause the Supreme Court presumed in favor of federal common law displacement,
the dissent appropriately applied the "speak directly" test.
186. See id. at 1251 (Mansmann, J., dissenting). The dissent used this argu-
ment in concluding that § 1821(k) displaced federal common law. Id.
(Mansmann, J., dissenting). Judge Mansmann stated:
The majority informs us that section 1821(k) does not address the liabil-
ity if directors and officers of federally-chartered depository institutions
.. . and was enacted only to preempt state insulating statutes. I have
difficulty comprehending how section 1821(k) can preserve the RTC's
right to sue the directors and officers of federal financial institutions for
simple negligence under federal common law, and at the same time, not
address the liability of these individuals in RTC actions.
Id. (Mansmann,J., dissenting).
187. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1746-53 (explaining Congress was pressured
by President Bush and voters to take some legislative action due to allegations of
bank executive fraud, corruption and overspending). For a detailed account of
the short schedule that the Senate labored under to enact FIRREA and the many
debates that were sparked among the senators, see Fischer, supra note 9 at 1746-53.
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Specifically, § 1821 (k)'s language and the legislative history of § 1821 (k)
are ambiguous regarding the availability of state or federal common law
actions for simple negligence.
The CityFed decision places a heavy burden on directors and officers
of financial institutions because it validates simple negligence claims, re-
gardless of their source of law. Nonetheless, one must distinguish between
state law and federal common law claims. The Supreme Court recognized
the significance of this distinction by emphasizing that acts of Congress
need not meet a high threshold to displace the federal common law. 188
By ignoring this distinction, CityFed will result in bank executives altering
their management conduct to avoid personal liability. These executives
will become overly cautious managers in an industry that requires a certain
level of risktaking. 189 As a result, productivity and growth will decline at a
time when the banking industry needs the freedom to act in ways that will
ensure its future stability.
Because the states control the substance of their own common law,
the Third Circuit properly allowed state law simple negligence actions.
The state may decide whether parties can bring simple negligence actions
against bank directors and officers. Because § 1821(k) does not demon-
strate an intent to usurp this right of the states, CityFed properly did not
preempt state law.
Conversely, no clear intent to preempt is required to displace federal
common law. Despite its ambiguity, § 1821(k)'s scope and coverage
speaks directly to the standard of care for bank executives. Thus, CityFed
improperly permitted federal common law actions to be brought along-
side § 1821(k).
In the wake of CityFed, bank directors and officers face simple negli-
gence liability regardless of how or where they are chartered. 190 Their
188. See Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1981) (noting Congress
displaces federal common law if its statute merely "speaks directly" to that area of
law and that higher showing of Congress's intent is neede to preempt state law).
189. See DeLisa R. Kilpatrick, DIC v. Canfield: A Death Penalty for Banks and
Their Directors for Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 281, 303
(1994) (concluding § 1821(k) should preempt all simple negligence actions for
policy reasons, thus, Canfield was wrongly decided). The concept of risk is inher-
ent in the banking industry and cannot, and should not, be totally eliminated. Id.
at 300-02. "[A] simple negligence standard ... forc[es] the decision-maker to be
risk-adverse instead of risk-neutral." Id. at 303.
190. The Business Roundtable discussed the negative impacts that result from
subjecting corporate directors to simple negative liability. See Business Roundtable,
supra note 55, at 6 (noting Model Draft would make simple negligence actions
more likely and thus, "[t]he board would become myopic in setting the planning
horizon for management policies, and the corporation would become more con-
cerned with short-term rather than long-term profit maximization.") (statement of
Professor Paul W. MacAvoy). The Roundtable also stated that increased director
liability through the ALI Model Draft would result in "corporate inability to be
flexible . . . increased costs to the corporation ... unwillingness and inability to
take the risks necessary to maintain competitiveness ... an unwillingness of quali-
fied individuals to serve as corporate directors." Id.
1996] NOTF 1067
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performance must survive stricter scrutiny, and innocent executives may
be held accountable merely for trying to maintain competitiveness. Sim-
ple negligence conduct did not cause the majority of the bank failures
during the 1980s crisis, and it generally will not cause a bank to decline
into receivership. As such, the emphasis of the decision in this regard may
be misplaced. Under CityFed, because bank executives will be subject to
federal common law, they cannot "shop" for a federally chartered bank to
manage. In order to manage effectively, bank directors and officers
should have the ability to decide whether they will be held to a simple or
gross negligence standard of liability.
Christopher S. Lam
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